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Certainly I'm much more sympathetic with Dewey than other pragmatists so 
. called, notably William James. There are two points where I depart radically 
from James: one, his pragmatic theory of truth, second his "Will to believe," 
which seems to me to be a way of giving aid and comfort to wishful thinkers. 
-W. V. 0. Quine, from a discussion with Lars Bergstrom 
and Dagfinn F0llesdal (F0llesdal 2001: 65-6) 
1 Introduction 
Quine and James both held that I must adjust my web of belief when I face 
a recalcitrant perceptual experience. But am I ever warranted in adjusting 
my beliefs to a recalcitrant emotion? This question provides a lens for bring-
ing into focus the relationship between Quine and James, and ultimately 
between Quine and classical pragmatism at large. ' 
Among the growing list of scholars who have considered Quine's relation-
ship to the pragmatist tradition, the lumpers have handily outnumbered the 
splitters. Quine's own protestations notwithstanding, he has been lumped 
with pragmatism on grounds of an allegedly direct historical influence, typi-
cally through either C. S. Peirce or C. I. Lewis, 1 or he has been lumped with 
pragmatism on grounds of supposed philosophical affinity.2 
There have been some skeptics about Quine's pragmatist bona fides, 
though, not the least Quine himself. In this essay, I throw myself in with 
these splitters. 3 
I begin by outlining Quine's "web of belief" model of theory confirma-
tion, an aspect of his work that is often supposed to place him in com-
munity with pragmatists like James in particular. Quine and James agree 
that we must manage our beliefs as a corporate body. And they agree that 
pragmatic considerations like simplicity and elegance must enter the picture 
when a choice between beliefs or theories is underdetermined by available 
evidence. But despite these real affinities, I point out a clear tension: in cases 
of underdetermination, James (but not Quine) suggests that agents are also 
permitted to take into consideration the emotional ramifications of a new 
belief or theory. 
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This opens James to the worry Quine raises in my epigraph: isn't it bad 
epistemic practice to allow one's hopes or fears to cloud one 's judgm ent 
about which descriptions of the world are actually true? I defend Jame s by 
offering a case study from the history of medicine. The Australian physician 
Barry Marshall is widely credited with co-discovering the bacterial ca use of 
peptic ulcer disease. For reasons I will explain, he had trouble establi shing 
this result through nonhuman animal experimentation . So at a time when 
his attempts to collect high quality evidence had been stymied, he purpo se-
fully swallowed a vial of the bacteria himself. The case illustrates how emo-
tional concerns sometimes do play an auspicious role in inquiry, just as 
James suggests. 
Finally, I offer a diagnosis of the disagreement between Jame s and Quin e. 
Although Quine's naturalism was designed as an alternative to Carnapian 
rational reconstruction, Quine tacitly retains one of logical positivism's 
crucially anti-pragmatist commitments-that philosophy of science should 
focus exclusively on the context of justification, not the context of discov-
ery (the distinction is originally from Reichenbach 1938: 6-7 ). To be sure, 
Quine rejects the notion that we have access to purely a priori logical prin-
ciples that can be used to reconstruct the justificatory status of our best 
scientific theories-that is, he rejects the logic of justification. But his natu-
ralistic alternative is emphatically not a turn toward what the pragmatists 
all called "inquiry"-it is not a turn toward an epistemology of discovery. 
Instead, Quine proposes a psychology (rather than a logic) of justification . 
His insistence on modeling our scientific commitments as a web of cognitive 
states that must be squared with pure sense experience, not emotion, reflects 
his refusal to take seriously an epistemology of discovery. 
In contrast, James cannot draw a sharp distinction between discovery 
and justification, for reasons I discuss at the end of the essay. His account 
of inquiry must therefore take some view of processes logical positivists 
wanted to relegate to the supposedly philosophically barren landscape of 
discove:.,,. 
Altho~gh pragmatists may disagree on what the proper role of emotion 
in inquiry 1s, ur on how precisely to do good epistemological work more 
generally, 4 I suggest that pragmatists all share an emphasis on discovery a~ a 
(perhaps the) crucial locus for epistemological inquiry. Since Quinean epis-
temology is always an epistemology of justification, he is not happily viewed 
as a member of the pragmatist tradition. 
2 Web of Belief 
Quine famously concluded his a.track on the analytic/synt?eti~ distincti~n 
by claimin th t the considerations we use to fit our sc1ent1fic commit-
ments w·rhg b a · are "where rational, pragmatic" (Quine 1951: 43). 
1 o servat1on f " · ,, C s 
Though h l 'b cl this usage o pragmatic to arnap, many 
e ater attn ute Q · , h I' d I · I 
commentators have seen an affinity between ume s o ism an c ass1ca 
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pr~gmatism. In particular, Quine's claim that when they confront empirical 
evidence, our beliefs form "a man-made fabric which impinges on experi-
ence only along the edges" evokes similarly holistic pronouncements from 
James (e.g., P: 34-6). 
The "web of belief," as Quine came to call it, suggests two distinct sorts 
of holism-meaning holism (the view that the meaning of any belief depends 
in some way on the web in which it is embedded) and confirmation holism 
(the view that the confirmation or refutation of any belief depends in some 
way on the web in which it is embedded). In the present discussion, I shall 
be concerned exclusively with the latter. 
Quine typically motivates his confirmation holism by appealing to 
Duhem-style underdetermination arguments. 6 According to this reasoning, 
no scientific hypothesis by itself produces a testable prediction-only scien-
tific hypotheses in conjunction with auxiliary hypotheses, plus logical and 
perhaps mathematical axioms, have empirical import. As a result, Quine's 
confirmation holism entails that when we adjust the web of belief in response 
to "recalcitrant experience," we necessarily face at least two related choices 
that might be construed as "pragmatic." First, we must choose how to redis-
tribute truth values in our existing web, and second, we must choose where 
to draw a line between beliefs (like those concerning logic and math ) we 
may want to hold true "come what may," and those quasi-empirical beliefs 
we are more willing to revise (Quine 1951: 40).7 
Although the phrase "web of belief" does not come from classical prag-
matism, 8 there are at least three aspects of this figure that do harken back to 
James. First, although James does not talk about a "web " of belief, he does 
say that a person accommodates a "new experience" by "modifying his 
previous mass of opinions" as a corporate body. His preferred metaphor is 
"a stock of old opinions," where "stock" is apparently meant in the biologi-
cal sense of a trunk or stem (White 1990: 5). When we have an unexpected 
experience, we must find a new idea that we can "graft upon the ancient 
stock with a minimum of disturbance" (P: 34-5). So both Quine and James 
suggest that "new" or "recalcitrant" experiences must be accommodated by 
our "opinions" or "beliefs" as a corporate body, and, conversely, both reject 
the notion that single beliefs are supported by single experiences.9 
Second, one upshot of Quine's rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinc-
tion is that there is allowable flexibility in choosing which of our beliefs to 
preserve and which to reject in the face of recalcitrant evidence. Although 
James does not argue directly against the analytic/synthetic distinction, ~e 
certainly sounds sympathetic to such a view when he says of our leeway in 
modifying our stock of beliefs that " [ t Jo a certain degree, therefore, every-
thing here is plastic" (P: 35, emphasis added). 
F. 11 · · "plas-ma y, one thmg that gmdes us in deciding how to warp our 
tic" stock of beliefs, for James, is a general tendency roward "extreme 
· [' ]" . · ns as we can. conservat1v ism -we try to save as much of the old opinIO . 
S. ·1 I Q · I d recalcitrant 1m1 ar Y, ume ong proposed that when we accommo ace 
"' 
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experience, "lo] ur choice is guided largely by the tendency to dislodge as 
little of previous doctrine as we can compatibly with the ideal of unity and 
simplicity" (from Quine's 1934 Carnap lectures, in Creath, Quine, and Car-
nap 1990: 63). 
For all this common background, though, there is an important tension 
between the two views over the role of emotion. Quine is very clear that 
what we are to adjust our web of beliefs to is a collection of sensory experi-
ence only-emotion does not figure in. For instance, consider the passage in 
which the "fabric'' metaphor first appears: 
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual 
matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic 
physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric 
which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the 
figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions 
are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions 
readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be redis-
tributed over some of our statements. 
(Quine 1951 : 39) 
For Quine, our beliefs constitute a "fabric" that we warp to fit "experi-
ence." Later in the same essay he writes that a scientist who makes improve-
ments to this fabric is "warping his scientific heritage to fit his continuing 
sensory promptings" (Quine 1951: 43). So it is clear that by "experience" 
Quine means sense experience. 
The notion that epistemically relevant "experience" should be modeled as 
pure input from our "sensory promptings"-again, as untainted by emotion-
is pervasive in Quine's later work as well. For instance, in "Epistemology 
Naturalized" he writes that the "stimulation of his sensory receptors is all 
the evidence anybody has had to go on" (Quine 1969: 75). And although the 
notion that the "fabric" should be understood as a network of "beliefs" gets 
modified somewhat-Quine sometimes describes our scientific heritage as 
"a fabric of sentences" (Quine 1960a: 374, emphasis added)-nevertheless, 
he consistently maintains that what is epistemologically relevant is a web of 
purely descriptive entities (beliefs or sentences) and the logical connections 
between them. 10 Whether our scientific heritage is understood in terms of 
mental entities like beliefs or in terms of non-mental things such as sentences, 
the upshot is that for the purposes of epistemology Quine thinks there is 
a dynamic relationship between an agent's logically connected network of 
descriptions and her ongoing, emotionally untainted sensory promptings. 
Quine has some misgivings about the notion of belief, but he does give 
something like a definition. In the clearest cases, a belief is "a bundle of dis-
positions. It may include a disposition to lip service, a disposition to accept 
a wager, and various dispositions to take precautions, or to book passage, 
or to tidy up the front room, or the like" (Quine 1987: 20). He doubts 
.. 
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that there is anything of substance that really links all these dispositio 
together beyond a "linguistic quirk"-namely, "the adapter that, which c: 
be prefixed thoughtlessly to any and every declarative sentence to produc 
a grammatically impeccable and hence presumably meaningful direct objec: 
for the verb believes" (Quine 1987: 21 ). So if Quine thinks our "scientific 
heritage" 11 is to be modeled as a web of beliefs that must be adjusted to our 
sensory promptings, then each of the web's nodes are dispositions to behave 
as though some set of propositions were true. 
Compare, now, the passage where James gives us his "stock of opinions" 
metaphor: 
The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new 
experience that puts them to a strain . Somebody contradicts them [the 
stock of opinions]; or in a reflective moment he discovers that they con-
tradict each other; or he hears of facts with which they are incompat-
ible; or desires arise in him which they [ the opinions] cease to satisfy. 
The result is an inward trouble to which his mind till then had been a 
stranger, and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous 
mass of opinions. He saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of 
belief we are all extreme conservatives. 
(P: 34-5, emphases added) 
This italicized phrase introduces a clear and interesting contrast between 
Quine and James. Where Quine thinks our web of beliefs must harmonize 
with our sensory promptings, James clearly thinks there are occasions when 
we must harmonize the web with emotional experiences as well. 
This passage has been subject to conflicting interpretations . For instance, 
(Gale 1999 : 126) seems to think the "desires" mentioned in the quoted pas-
sage are, in the first instance, part of the web that must be adjusted to fit new 
experience, rather than as part of the new experience to which we fit our 
web. But in fact, James mentions new "desires" in the context of discussing 
new aspects of experience that do not harmonize with our "stock of old 
opinions." Thus I read this passage, i~stead, along the same lines as (White 
1990: 9): James and Quine agree that each of us has a web of beliefs that we 
must harmonize with "experience," but James has a broader conception of 
"experience" since he intends both sensory promptings and emotions to be 
included under this term. 12 
Now the notion that our beliefs must square not only with our sense 
experience but also with our desires might smack of exactly the ~ind of 
"wishful thinking" worries about James that Quine raised in my epigraph. 
Indeed, passages like this apparently lend credence to critics who say James 
thinks that whether or not I find a belief personally satisfying is relevant to 
whether I should think it true. h 
Certainly, more recent proponents of Quine's pragmatist credentials av~ 
tried to disentangle a thread of the pragmatist tradition that he supposedly r'0 , 
pies, and that minimizes the role of emotion in cognition. In particular, C er}' 
st 
bn, 
Jarnes, Quine , Emotions, and Beliefs 233 
Misak distinguishes C. S. Peirce's holism, which she think s involves the view that 
hypotheses must be vindicated or rejected according to whether they "a re empir-
ically confirmed, fit with our otherwise grounded knowledge, etc.," from Jarnes's 
fuzzy-headed sentimentalism, according to which hypothe ses ha\'e ro pa s the 
rest of being "satisfying to me" (Misak 2013a: 66 ). She then makes swift work 
of dividing Quine from the fuzzy-headed James precisely in term of how each 
man thinks the confirmation holist should respond to recalcitrant experience: 
Quine thinks that our choices about what to revise, \\·hen faced with 
recalcitrant experience , are based on "pra gmatic· choice . He think s 
that theories are underdetermined by the evidence . Hence, theory choice, 
once the evidence has run out, boils dow n to consider~ttions of simplic-
ity, elegance, and avoiding massive destru ction of our well-grounded 
beliefs.13 This is not quite the Jame sian idea that when the evidence foils 
short of determining a belief , we can choose to believe as we will. For 
Quine and James differ about what kinds of non-evidential grounds can 
be brought to bear on an underdetermined theor y choice-Quine would 
never allow for a positive effect of the theory on its believers. One sur-
mises that it was the whiff of similarity to James on this matter that moti-
vated Quine to distance himself from the pragmatism so clearly manifest 
in his view. 
(Misak 2013a: 201 ) 
For Misak, James and Quine agree that considerations of simplicity, ele-
gance, and belief-conservativism rightly come into play when evidence is not 
coercive; but she thinks James adds a further test of whether the potential 
new belief is "satisfying to me" (Misak 2013a: 66 ). Misak conjectures that 
Quine's reticence about identifying as a pragmatist stems from his desire to 
repudiate just this sort of Jamesean sentimentalism . 
Misak is clearly right that James thinks emotion plays an ineliminable 
role in cognition in some way, as we have just seen. There are many other 
examples we could cite that lend credence to this reading . For instance, in 
"The Sentiment of Rationality," James says that if our passional nature 
helps those who, as Cicero says, "vim naturae magis sentiunt" [feel the 
force of nature more], it is good and not evil. Pretend what we may, 
the whole man within us is at work when we form our philosophical 
opinions. Intellect, will, taste, and passion co-operate just as they do in 
practical affairs. 
(WTB: 77, emphases mine) 14 
And he elsewhere likens the scientist who has a knack for dreaming up 
promising hypotheses to the poet. The "genesis" of scientific hypotheses is 
strictly akin to that of the flashes of poetry and sallies of wit to which 
the instable brain-paths equally give rise. But whereas the poetry and 
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wit (like the science of the ancients) are their "own excuse for being," 
and have to run the gauntlet of no farther test, the "scientific" concep-
tions must prove their worth by being "verified." This test, however, is 
the cause of their preservation, not that of their production. 
(PP: 1232-1233) 
An important clarification emerges in this latter passage. As I have else-
where argued (Klein 2015), sometimes it seems as though James wants to 
give emotion a central role only in the context of discovery-in particular, 
in the context of framing hypotheses. He typically avoids claiming that emo-
tions are centrally involved in our final justification of a hypothesis. 
Thus, James often credits Darwin with distinguishing the causes that pro-
duce a novel trait (spontaneous variations, in the biological case) from the 
causes of that trait's being preserved or eliminated in a population (natural 
selection, among other factors). In the Principles passage, the point is that 
we should make a similar distinction when it comes to hypotheses. Emotion 
and wit are part of the causes of a hypothesis; dispassionate testing is how 
we ultimately choose whether to adopt or reject that hypothesis. 
But this suggests we might be able to harmonize the relationship between 
Quine and James, after all, for their respective webs of belief could sim-
ply have been intended as models of different phenomena entirely. Perhaps 
Quine was modeling justification, whereas James was modeling discovery. 
If both men could agree that emotion is irrelevant in the context of justifi-
cation, but sometimes relevant in the context of discovery, then there is no 
serious divide here after all. 
The case for harmony is perhaps bolstered by some passages in "Episte-
mology Naturalized." Quine opens that essay by announcing that episte-
mology "is concerned with the foundations of science" (Quine 1969: 69), 
which sounds like a concern with scientific justification exclusively. He goes 
on to describe the kind of epist~mological foundations he thinks his natural-
istic program can make sense of: 
Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter 
of psychology and hence of natural science . It studies a natural phenom-
enon, viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accord.ed 
a certain experimentally controlled input--certain patterns of irradia-
tion in assorted frequencies, for instance-and in· the fullness of time 
the subject delivers as output a description of the three-dimensional 
external world and its history. The relation between the meager input 
and the torrential output is a relation that we are prompted to study 
for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted epistemology; 
namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways 
one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence. ) 
(Quine 1969: 82-3 
.... 
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What we want to know, according to Quine , is " how evidence relates ro 
theory. " Evidence can bear all sorts of uninterest ing relations ro theory of 
course. But the specific relation Quine seems to haYe in mind is just ification, 
here. 15 If that's right, then the purpose of making a psychologica l inquiry 
into the relationship between the "meager input " of our sensory prompt ings 
and the " torrential output " of well-confirmed scientific theory is to shed 
light specifically on the nature of justification. 16 
For his part , James certainl y has more interest in giYing an account of 
scientific disco very (as illustrated by the passage likening hypothes is gen-
eration to "flashes of poetr y" ) than does Quine. And what is more , there 
are passages that suggest that much like Quine , Jame s thinks just ification 
should be a comparatively dispassionate undertakin g. For instance , in '"The 
Will to Believe," he writes that the "purely judging mind " should "k eep 
weighing reasons pro et contra with an indifferent hand ; it is only for the 
specific "purposes of discovery " that "such indifference is to be less highly 
recommended. " James tells us that in this laner context , science would be 
far less advanced than she is if the passionate desires of indi\ ·idua ls to get 
their own faiths confirmed had been kept out of the game " (WTB: 26 ). 
If we take passages like this seriously, James may seem to agree with 
Quine that justification is a dispassionate affair, and that it is only for the 
sake of discovery that emotion is permined to figure in. Let's call this the 
"weak reading" of James, a reading that stands to help the case for harmony 
with Quine. 
I myself have emphasized the importance of this distinction in Jame s 
between discovery and justification (in Klein 2015 ). But\' hat about the first 
James passage I reproduced involving emotion (P: 34-5 )? That passage does 
not portray emotion as merely helping us dream up an ingenious hypothes is 
but as pressuring us to give up this or that descriptive belief we had ante-
cedently held. That does seem broadly in keeping with Ylisak's reading of 
James, according to which emotions are perrnined to affect not just h~]>oth-
esis generation but also theory choice . 
And that passage is not an aberration. Here are some others: 
Well, of two conceptions equall y fit to satisfy the logical demand , that 
one which awakens the active impulses, or satisfies other ::estheric 
demands better than the other, will be accounted the more rational con-
ception, and will deservedly prevail. 
(WIB: 66 ) 
Notice that when a theory choice is underdeterrnined, the theory that arouses 
our "active impulses" or otherwise "satisfies" our " ::estheric demands " (for 
James, these are demands to feel joy and pleasure, or to aYoid sorrow and 
pain) 17 does not just prevail as a psychological matter of fact. Such a theor y 
"deservedly prevail[s]." Much as Misak suggests , James is making a point 
a bout how we ought to make a choice between competing , underdeter-
mined theories. 
, 
236 Alexander Klein 
And in Pragmatism, we also find this passage: 
A new opinion counts as 'true' just in proportion as it gratifies the indi-
vidual's desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs in 
stock. It (the new opinion] must both lean on old truth and grasp new 
fact; and its success (as I said a moment ago) in doing this, is a matter 
for the individual's appreciation . When old truth grows, then , by new 
truth's addition, it is for subjective reasons. 
(P: 36 , emphases mine) 
Here James portra ys desire as figuring into the web of belief twice over. 
First, he apparently thinks that no vel experiences do not force a change of 
opinion by themselves. Belief revision sometimes 18 requires the consent of a 
subject-in some cases , she must first have a desire to square her opinions 
with novel experiences before she will actually change her mind in response 
to novelty. Second, when she does so respond , what counts as successful 
opinion-accommodation is a matter of personal satisfaction as well. The 
subject provisionally stops tinkering with her own opinions when she is 
personally satisfied with the fit between those opinions and her on.going 
expenences. 
Now these three passages (P: 34-5, 36, and WTB: 66) suggest a stron-
ger reading of J~mes, as contrasted with the weaker reading I myself once 
developed (Klein 2015). The stronger reading portrays him as holding that 
emotion is not only useful for hypothesis generation, but that it is sometimes 
useful for influencing underdetermined belief choices, as well. 19 And the strong 
reading suggests a more dissonant relationship between Quine and James. 
So which is correct: the weak or strong reading of James? Clearly, the 
weak reading requires simply ignoring several provocati ve passages , as we 
have just seen. I now think that cost is too high. But the strong reading also 
has an interpretive cost if it involves ascribing a philosophically indefensible 
view to James. So we must now face, head on, the familiar wishful thinking 
worries that we have already seen Quine articulating . 
In order to show that giving emotion a legitimate role in belief-choice is a 
more defensible epistemological view than it might seem, I will now change 
tracks and consider a case from the history of medicine. I shall argue that in 
this case, emotions played something like the fruitful cognitive role James 
envisioned. In other words, I hope to make the strong reading more palat-
able by offering a response to the wishful thinking objection . I will return to 
the relationship between James and Quine in the final section. 20 
3 Emotion and Wishful Thinking 
The case I want to consider has to do with research during Quine's lifeti~1e 
into the etiology of peptic ulcer disease (PUD). The disease is identified w_irh 
the occurrence of either gastric or duodenal (upper intestinal) ulcers, w~ich 
can be incredibly debilitating. They can lead to severe internal bleeding, 
st 
James, Quine, Emotions, and Beliefs 237 
digestive blockage, and even death. In the late 1990s, about 1 in 300 Ameri-
can seniors were hospitalized for the condition (Feinstein et al. 2010: 1412). 
At that time, the United States spent almost $6 billion a year in health-care 
costs alone dealing with the problem, not to mention the untold hours of 
lost work (Sonnenberg and Everhart 1997). 
Until the late '90s, the standard treatment for PUD was acid blockers 
(Munnangi and Sonnenberg 1997). This is because through at least the 
middle of that decade, the primary ca use of the disease was thought to be 
excessive gastric acid secretion, with secondary genetic and environmental 
causal factors (the latter supposedly including stress, poor diet, and smok-
ing; Marshall 2006: 796). 
We now know that the most common cause of these ulcers is, in fact, 
infection with bacteria called Helicobacter pylori (H. pylori), and by the 
end of the '90s, the Federal Drug Administration had approved the first 
antibiotic treatment for PUD. But the story of the discovery that H. pylori 
are pathogenic provides a nice illustration of the beneficial role emotion 
sometimes plays in scientific inquiry. 
The discovery is chiefly attributed to an Australian doctor named Barry 
Marshall (along with his colleague Robin Warren). In the early 1980s, the 
prevailing explanations of the etiology of PUD had become particularly 
entrenched be:cause of the development of a new class of acid-blocking 
drugs (called H2 receptor antagonists, or H2ra) that temporarily alleviated 
PUD symptoms. This suggested that excessive gastric acid was indeed the 
primary cause of the disease. What is more, two blockbuster H2ras were 
generating, respectively, $1 billion (Tagamet) and $3 billion (Zantac) per 
year in sales, and thus the medical establishment was particularly loathe to 
consider alternative explanations at that time (Marshall 2006: 789). 
During a gastroenterology rotation in 1981, Marshall had been given a 
list of patients whose stomach biopsies had been positive for as-yet uniden-
tified spiral bacteria. Marshall did some research and found that these 
bacteria had rarely been connected with any particular disease, and he sub-
sequently conducted a study of 100 patients to try to determine if they had 
any common symptoms (Marshall 2006: 790). He found a significant corre-
lation between infection with the bacteria and incidence of ulcers (Marshall 
2006: 792). 
But correlation is not enough to establish that a bacterial species is a 
pathogen. The standard way to establish this is to satisfy what are known 
as Koch's postulates: 
1 The bacteria must be present in every case of the disease. 
2 The bacteria must be isolated from the host with the disease and grown 
in pure culture. 
3 The specific disease must be reproduced when a pure culture of the bac-
teria is inoculated into a healthy susceptible host. 
4 The bacteria must be recoverable from the experimentally infected host. 
(Marshall 2006: 794 ). 
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By 1983, the chief difficulty was satisfying the third and fourth postulates . 
Marshall tried to infect four healthy piglets with the bacteria, but the infec-
tion did not succeed . What is more, prior literature on the bacteria had 
noted that cats are almost universally infected, but yet have no associated 
symptoms (Marshall 2006: 790, 794 ). 
Marshall wanted to study the effect of infection on humans, but he wor-
ried about his prospects for passing an ethics board (Marshall 2006: 797). 
Presumably, his lack of an animal model would have made it difficult to 
convince such a board to approve infecting healthy humans. And simply 
giving antibiotics to patients who already had PUD would not be allowed, 
he feared, because the condition was life threatening and the treatment too 
experimental (Marshall 2006: 796). 
Marshall's now famous response was to self-experiment since, in his 
words, the "only person in the world at that time who could make an 
informed consent about the risk of swallowing the Helicobacter was me" 
(Marshall 2006 : 797). So in July of 1984, after a preliminary stomach 
biopsy was negative for the bacteria, Marshall mixed a culture plate of H. 
pylori in a solution of alkaline peptone water (which helps keep bacteria 
alive). He then swallowed the entire vial himself and waited. 
Within days, he began vomiting and came down with halitosis, nausea, 
and indigestion-all symptoms of PUD. When a stomach biopsy on day ten 
was positive for H. pylori, Marshall considered the experiment a success. 
"Helicobacter was a proven pathogen," he triumphantly writes (Marshall 
2006: 797). Fortunately, his symptoms had abated by day 14 when a final 
biopsy showed that his body had apparently eradicated the H. pylori by 
itself (Marshall 2006: 799). 2 1 
I want to make several interpretive points about this case. First, in the 
summer of 1984, as he was considering swallowing H. pylori, both James 
and Quine would have to say that Marshall faced a choice of belief. Specifi-
cally, he had to choose whether or not to believe his own hypothesis that H. 
pylori cause PUD. 
Popular science may counsel that one should merely entertain (rather 
than fully believe) a hypothesis one is testing. But recall that for both Quine 
and James, a belief that pis constituted by a disposition to behave as though 
p were true. As we have just seen, Marshall attempted to infect piglets and, 
eventually, himself with H. pylori with the express intent of document-
ing subsequent PUD symptoms . Surely, that counts as acting as though H. 
pylori cause PUD. If this is right, then for those who accept the characteristi-
cally pragmatist James/Quine account of belief, Marshall (in the summer ~f 
1984) counts as genuinely believing that H. pylori is a pathogen. 22 What is 
more, his willingness to swallow a vial of bacteria that, at that time, had not 
been widely studied reflects stunning confidence in his attending belief that 
he understood the causal pathways of H. pylori. 23 
Second, Marshall was choosing between his own hypothesis and the c~m-
peting acid-proliferation theory, and that belief choice was underdetermmed 
·: .... 
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d1·t ·m,r :t111 g <.m1dir,,m with(Jut fi;:tyini.; to<> much. While I wa'> ure o,he 
WOtJIJ rn, h:1v • apprc,ved of the t xpcri,n ·111 ahead ,,f rimt, once I hegan 
'ih a'4. pt ·d i wai, an imi,cmant milc:,tonc. Like me she fclr the need 
tn fa1,t rack th· re·, an. h .... Alth()ugh I had di'><.:U'i'>Cd the prop0i;ed 
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r ,;r ttllin~ my wife h~ the time had come. I C()uld see that the outco,ne 
might mak e a very large difference tr, our lives. I had <;ubmittccl a grant 
applka J()O for fonding in 1985, but it was quite likely that my app lica-
ti,,n 11,,uJd faiJ. ln additi<m, if nothing happened in my experiment, if 
the hactuia. did not t.ake, if kvc n J gai,triti<,H did not develop, then my 
wh,,Jt hype hc"i~ could ht= wrc;ng. At the very lea<;t, the disease wa far 
m<:m: C4',mpHcared than J had 1,uppo.:,ed and it would be extrernely hard 
1 ami1inc.e rile skep ics that we had found something important. If that 
r,a urred, my fu ture fobs mi~ht be in clinical medicine and I would be 
r,ff intervtl!wing fr.JY pfacement in a private practice, perhaps in a remote 
area where my eccentric ulcer therJries were less well known. 
On the other hand, a successfu l infection wtth Heltcohacter would 
pr,tnt t:FJWard, a career tn dimca l research, more excttmg but likely tn be 
financially in, ecure. J chose ntJt ttJ raise the issue until the family settled 
dl)wn a little. 
(Mar shall 2006 : 797-8, emphasc~ add ed) 
. ~ar .haJI mis 30 'ftan old, and he and his wife had four young children 
,, Vlt>rr,• ab<J ·. Part icularly for an early-career researcher, choices about 
,,h.<i .. e'hptrimrntal prc;gram ro pursue land thus ahout what hypotheses 
one-fihould bdi£:t:J are inevitabtr tied up with one\ desires and fear abo ut 
f,,r • ft r~, ab<~u one\ abili y w provide for one's famil y, abo ut one's own 
prrzpei fr,r a in er~ ing and fruitful career, and so on. 
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Again, for pragmatists, the question of whether Marshall (in 1984) should 
believe that H. pylori cause PUD amounts to a question about whether he 
should act as though H . pylori are really pathogenic, and so act by pursu-
ing the right kind of experiments. It is clear from this passage that he hoped 
H. pylori were pathogenic and that his experiments would tend to confirm 
this belief. One reason he hoped he was right was that he apparently was 
more interested in having an "exciting " career in research than a perhaps 
more financially secure job in "clinical medicine, " which he apparentl y wor-
ried would be boring and require him to move his famil y to an undesir-
able "remote area" to boot. So one motivation for pursuing this H. pylori 
research involved hopes and fears about his future career. 
Marshall had another emotional motivation for hoping his belief about 
H. pylori was correct. 
If I was right, then treatment for ulcer disease would be revolutionized . 
It would be simple, cheap, and it would be a cure. It seemed to me for 
the sake of patients this research had to be fast-tracked. The sense of 
urgency and frustration with the medical community was partl y due to 
disposition and age. However, the primary reason was a practical one. 
I was driven to get this theory proven quickly to provide curative treat-
ment for the millions of people suffering with ulcers around the world . 
(Marshall 2006: 786) 
On his telling at least, Marshall felt sympathy with suffering patients. He 
explicitly says he hoped his own hypothesis was right because it would sug-
gest a "simple, cheap ... cure" to help alleviate this worldwide suffering. 
Again, in the summer of 1984, his attempts to gather decisive evidence 
for or against his own belief had failed. He needed an animal model, 
but pigs proved difficult to infect with this bacteria, and cats, who are 
almost universally infected, seem not to get ulcers as a result of the bac-
teria. What in fact pushed Marshall to choose his own etiological expla-
nation of PUD over the standard account was not only , as Misak puts 
the Quinean point, "considerations of simplicity, elegance, and avoiding 
massive destruction of our well-grounded beliefs. " 24 Such considerations 
no doubt figured in. But so did a hope for a certain kind of career and a 
fear of avoiding another, empathy for suffering patients, and a hope to 
find a cure for them. 
Indeed, any researcher faced with no prospects for funding a human study 
or for clearing such a study with an ethics board might be unlikely to run 
a dangerous experiment on herself unless she had a very serious, emotional 
commitment to the truth of her own hypothesis . So I suggest that Marshall 
gives us a clear case of a belief choice that was quite legitimately sensitive 
to emotional considerations . Without his own emotional investment, he 
might well have dropped his hypothesis after the piglet experiment failed. 
And we have seen James making exactly the right point, that without those 
• 
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"passionate desires" in place, "science would be far less advanced than she 
is" (WTB: 26). 
Quine might reply that if Marshall allowed his own empathy for patients, 
or his own careerist hopes and fears, to influence his belief, it was sim-
ply bad science. But Barry Marshall was awarded a Nobel Prize for this 
research in 2005. Unless philosophers are in the business of criticizing sci-
entific conclusions from some supposedly more secure vantage point (pace 
what Quine himself says; see, e.g., Quine 1960b: 275-6) , this seems like 
a highly dubious move . Nobel prizes are generally reserved for the most 
secure, and indeed the most dramatic, of scientific discoveries. One could 
scarcely hope for a stronger normative imprimatur coming from within sci-
ence itself. 
4 Discovery and Justification, Again 
So what has gone on here? If the point is that science is sometimes hard, not 
just in a cognitive but also in a personal, emotional sense-surely, Quine 
can accept that just as well as James, right? It sometimes takes courage and 
emotional fortitude and a willingness to make personal sacrifice if one is 
going to pursue a novel or unpopular research program. There should be 
nothing surprising about this, and one hopes Quine would admit this much. 
But then what can we make of Quine's insistence that the "human sub-
ject" that naturalized epistemology is to study should be conceived of as an 
input-output device (Hylton 2007: 81), where the inputs are pure sensory 
stimulations caused by "patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies?" 
Why, in particular, does Quine not include emotions as part of the experien-
tial input of the epistemic subject? 
One tempting answer comes from a suggestion I have already made. If Quine 
sees epistemology-even properly reformed, naturalized epistemology-
as the study of what justifies our best scientific theories, then he may be 
prepared to accept a role for pragmatic considerations about a theory's sim-
plicity and elegance, which one might plausibly think are conducive to a 
theory's intelligibility and utility, without being prepared to accept a role 
for considerations about a theory's emotional appeal, which may not be 
similarly conducive .25 On this reading, Quine is tacitly chalking emotional 
factors in belief-choice up to the discovery side of things. 
Bear in mind that Quine thinks every belief choice depends on pragmatic 
considerations in some way. He does not think we can isolate individual 
beliefs that are directly responsible to experience. So he is proposing that 
our web of beliefs is supported, as a corporate body, by evidence from sense 
perception. We have seen that he thinks ·the support provided by sense 
receptors is incomplete-the senses provide only a "meager input" with 
respect to the "torrential output" of well-confirmed scientific theory. Quin-
ean epistemology thus becomes the study of "ways one's theory of nature 
transcends any available evidence" 26 so that one can understand precisely 
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where pragmatic considerations like simplicity and elegance help fortify that 
"meager" sensory "input." What I am suggesting is that there is no similarly 
fortifying role for emotion to play, for Quine, because the kind of support 
he is exclusively interested in is that which tends to justify scientific theories. 
He is not interested in understanding what strategies scientists have fol-
lowed for getting theories confirmed in the first place. 
The notion that Quine's is an epistemology of justification exclusively 
brings us back, finally, to the question of whether we can harmonize his ver-
sion of the web of belief with James 's by construing these as models of dif-
ferent phenomena-perhaps Quine 's web models justification, and James's 
models discovery. I will conclude by arguing that while this might be a good 
reading of Quine , it is not a good reading of James because the latter cannot 
accept a sharp division between justification and discovery for the purpose s 
of epistemology. 
To see why, consider this passage in James: 
The philosophy of evolution offers us to-day a new criterion to serve as an 
ethical test between right and wrong. Previous criteria, it says, being sub-
jective, have left us still floundering in variations of opinion and the status 
belli. Here is a criterion which is objective and fixed: That is to be called 
good which is destined to prevail or survive. But we immediately see that 
this standard can only remain objective by leaving myself and my conduct 
out. If what prevails and survives does so by my help, and cannot do so 
without that help; if something else will prevail in case I alter my conduct-
how can I possibly now, conscious of alternative courses of action open 
before me, either of which I may suppose capable of altering the path of 
events, decide which course to take by asking what path events will follow? 
If they follow my direction, evidently my direction cannot wait on them. 
The only possible manner in which an [ ethical] evolutionist can use his 
standard is the obsequious method of forecasting the course society would 
take but for him, and then putting an extinguisher on all personal idiosyn-
crasies of desire and interest, and with bated breath and tiptoe tread follow-
ing as straight as may be at the tail, and bringing up the rear of everything. 
(WTB: 81-2 ) 
This is a discussion of a crudely evolutionist meta-ethical theory, according to 
which whatever moral principles survive in the community are the best princi-
ples. meta-ethical evolutionists claim their account portrays moral principles 
(for instance, the principle that one ought to maximize pleasure) as objec-
tive in the sense that whether such a principle survives in the long run does 
not depend on any one person's emotional idiosyncrasies . But James argues 
that even if meta-ethical evolutionism is true, an individual agent should still 
regard her own emotional constitution as relevant to the moral principles she 
stands up for, because her own passionate advocacy for some principle may 
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We have to extend this point to the cognitive domain, as James himself 
had developed a kind of evolutionary theor y of truth. Pragmatists agree 
that an idea counts as true in virtue of being incorporated into the long-run 
consensus among an appropriate community of inquirers. 27 James depicted 
this process as a kind of survival of the fittest ideas (Klein 2013). 28 It seems 
obvious that just like the passionate moral advocate in the prior para-
graph, a researcher's passionate commitment to proving a novel idea today 
will sometimes help get that idea adopted by the community of inquir-
ers tomorrow. But then a researcher like Barry Marshall was not sinning 
against the survival of good ideas-not sinning against sound pragmatist 
epistemology-if his emotions drove his convictions during a trying period 
of his research. His experiment could have failed, but his emotional con-
viction would have represented nothing epistemically untoward so long 
as the broader scientific community was prepared appropriatel y to vet his 
results. 
It is worth remembering, here, that James had a constructive attitude 
about proof. The facts may be fixed, but ideas depicting those supposed 
facts are neither true nor false until actual inquirers have produced evidence. 
Ideas have no valence until an adequate proof is in hand, in other words (P: 
97, 108). 29 For James, whether a particular idea is true at a given time is a 
matter, roughly, of whether the idea is a consensus view at the time in ques-
tion, and whether the idea would also resist future investigative scrutiny. 
So there is an independent fact of the matter as to whether or not H. pylori 
cause PUD, of course. But James would say that the belief that H. pylori 
cause PUD is neither true nor false until it is proved or refuted. And actually 
proving this particular belief, I have tried to argue, turned out to require a 
persistent emotional commitment on the part of Barry Marshall. 
So here is why James cannot accept a sharp separation between justifica-
tion and discovery for the purposes of epistemology. Suppose James were to 
give an epistemological analysis of some idea by appealing only to evidence-
like factors 30 from the so-called context of justification, ignoring the histori -
cal story of how the idea in question came to be established in the commu-
nity in the first place. Given his account of truth, that would be like claiming 
to give an evolutionary explanation of a biological trait by a) showing how 
the trait is now contributing to the reproductive success of some species 
that bears it without also b) offering any account of either the species' or 
the trait's evolutionary history. A full explanation in evolutionary biology 
addresses both a) and b). Similarly, an epistemological explanation cannot 
be complete by James's lights unless it addresses both evidence-like factors 
that we think make the idea worth endorsing, today, and historical factors 
that got the idea fixed in the community of inquirers to begin with. In other 
words , Jamesean epistemology cannot simply set aside questions from the 
so-called context of discovery. 
If this outlook is broadly correct, then it is a serious question for James-
ean epistemology why this particular claim about the world (and not some 
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other claim) became a target of inquiry in the first place. Think of our case 
study again. If there were no Barry Marshall and no Robin Warren, then 
possibly, the claim that H. pylori cause PUD would not even be a subject 
of gastroenterological discussion today, because H. pylori might then never 
have been clearly identified at all, let alone connected with PUD. And the 
emergence of H. pylori as a subject of gastroenterological inquiry is a story 
in which emotional conviction is central. 
Thus in the end, I do not think James can be read as offering his web of 
belief as a model of scientific discovery rather than as a model of justification. 
For James, scientific inquiry is a process that gets carried out in real, human 
time; epistemology aims at understanding how that entire process unfolds. 
Since emotions sometimes play an indispensable role in the course of inquiry, 
they must be studied by epistemology as James conceives of that enterprise. 
So long as we accept what seems undeniable-that emotions like hope, 
fear, and sympathy may be indispensable to a researcher who is struggling 
to prove a new and perhaps controversial theory-then if we are proper 
pragmatists, we should not be afraid of an epistemology that countenances 
wishful thinking. I would like to thank the US-UK Fulbright Commission 
for financial support while I was writing this paper. 
Notes 
1 For accounts of the direct, historical influence on Quine, such as it was, from prag-
matists like Peirce and Lewis Lewis, see Godfrey-Smith ... Godfrey-Smith 2014: 
54-8; Sinclair 2012; Isaac 2005; Misak 2013a: 197-9 , 2012: 275. Godfrey-Smith 
is a funny case because he sees Quine as the chief representative of pragmatism 
in the second half of the twentieth-century, but denies that Quine was faithful to 
that tradition's original philosophical virtues. One pithy account of Lewis's sup-
posed influence on Quine is worth quoting at length. Donald Davidson writes, 
"I do think that C. I. Lewis had a tremendous influence on Quine, but Quine 
doesn't realize it. The explanation for that is that Quine had no training in phi-
losophy and so when he took Lewis's course in epistemology , he took for granted 
that this is what everybody knows about epistemology . Quine didn 't realize that 
Lewis was any different from everyone else; pretty soon he worked out that there 
are some things he didn't agree with Lewis about, like the analytids ynthetic 
distinction. I don't think Quine would put it this way. As I said, I don't think he 
realized any of this, but you can find most of Quine's epistemolog y in C. I. Lewis 
minus the analytic-synthetic distinction . Epistemology naturalized is very close 
to the heart of C. I. Lewis. I don't think that Quine knows the extent to which 
there really is a sequence that starts with Kant and goes through C. I. Lewis and 
ends with Quine" (quoted at Misak 2013a : 198) . 
2 Scholars who suggest an affinity between Quine and pragmatism on substance 
include Creath, Quine, and Carnap 1990: 17-2; Gellner 1979: Chapter 11; 
Rescher 2012 : 294-6; Misak 2013a: Chapter 11; Bernstein 2005; Putnam and 
Conant 1990: xi; and Rorty 1979: 10. 
3 Christopher Hookway suggests that classical pragmatism had only a minimal 
impact on Quine, and thus that it is a mistake to read him as part of the prag-
matist tradition (Hookway 1988: 1-2). Two more recent skeptics include Brown 
2006, who offers a brief but critical discussion of some of the lumping litera-
ture (also see Brown 2012), and Richardson 2013, who dissents from Misak's 
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~ortrayal of quine as a pragmati st. Misak responds in Misak 2013b. In an ear-
lier paper, _I t_ned to distance James from Quine, but allowed that the latter was 
part of a d1stmct, Peircean strand in the pragmatist tradition (Klein 2008 ). I now 
doubt that Quine is happil y viewed as part of a Peircean tradition for reasons 
that should be clear when the rest of the present essay is read in conjunction with 
Hookway 2000: Chapters 9-10, 1993: esp. §3. 
4 T~ese disagreements are in evidence in my ongoing conversation with Cheryl 
M1~ak,_ who defend s a m'?re Peircean form of pragmatism; see Misak 2015 , 
which 1s a response to Klem 2015. Misak 2013b is in part a response to Klein 
2013, which in turn is a response to Misak 2013a. 
5 Quine writes , " I am not clear on what it takes to qualify as a pragmati st. I was 
merely taking the word from Carnap and handing it back: in whate ver sense 
the framework for science is pragmatic, so is the rest of science" (Quine 1991: 
272); elsewhere he write s that he had not understood what C. J. Lewis had 
meant by "pragmatism" (Quine 1981: 23). The epigraph of this chapter reflects 
Quine 's typical disavowal of any direct influence from classical pragmati sm. On 
this topic, also see Quine 1985: 38, where he says in high school he had a copy 
of William James's Pragmatism which he read "compulsively and believed and 
forgot all." Hookway points out that Quine largely abandons talk about "prag-
matism" after From a Logical Point of View in 1953; see Hookwa y 1988: 50. 
6 For two straightforward treatments of Quine's underdetermination reasoning, 
see Resnik 2005 : 414-15; and Ben-Menahem 2005: 248. 
7 For a helpful historical discussion of Quine's evolution particularl y on this sec-
ond point, see Frost-Arnold 2011. Frost-Arnold shows that in his 1934 Carnap 
lectures, Quine was willing to claim that we could hold putative empirical beliefs 
true come what may, but not until his 1951 "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" was 
Quine prepared to accept that putative logical truths could be revised. 
8 Quine's own use of the metaphor traces to a book entitled "Web of Belief" that 
he co-authored with J. S. Ullian (Quine and Ullian 1970 ). In personal commu-
nication, Ullian writes, "I don't know where the phrase, our title, came from. 
I don't know of any use of it before ours, but that rules nothing out. Quine and 
I batted around a lot of ideas and phrases-both of us always seeking the tres 
hon mot-whenever we got together to work on the book .... Who first used 
the phrase , or whether it was 'found' somewhere, may be beyond retrieval." The 
notion of a "web of belief" actually appears in a 1937 work by the anthropolo-
gist E. E. Evans-Pritchard: "All their beliefs hang together .. .. In this web of 
belief every strand depends upon every other strand, and a Zande cannot get out 
of its meshes because it is the only world he knows. The web is not an external 
structure in which he is enclosed. It is the texture of his thought and he cannot 
think that his thought is wrong" (Evans-Pritchard 1937: 194-5 ). This passage 
is cited in a somewhat different connection in Baghramian 2004 : 123. Ullian 
tells me that he was not aware of the Evans-Pritchard passage; I cannot find any 
evidence one way or the other about whether Quine (who had an obvious inter-
est in anthropology) might have read the passage himself, though a later volume 
Evans-Pritchard edited (Evans-Pritchard 1954) does appear in the bibliograph y 
of Quine 's· Word and Object (1960b: 257). 
9 This is a point about confirmation, but note that when it comes to meaning 
Quine is not quite as holistic as he is often supposed to be. He held that an 
observation sentence in fact "has an empirical content all its own," and thus 
that it is only "once we get beyond observation sentences" that meaning "ceases 
in general to have any clear applicability to single sentences" (Quine 1969: 89, 
emphasis added). For Quine, observation sentences, of co~rse, are those that 
would elicit the same verdict from any competent speaker rn a language com-
munity given the same sensory stimulation (Quine 1969: 86-7). 
J 
246 Alexander Klein 
10 To take just one more exa mpl e, at Quine 1960 b: 12-13 th e fabri c i!-> cornpo ~cd 
of "all senten ces, and indeed everything we ever say about the world," and the 
" logical truth s at least, and no doubt man y more commonpla ce sentencei, too .. . 
provide connections" between the other item s in the web. Quin e quil:kly adds 
tha t when we are considering how to squar e any one sentenc e with the rest 
of the web, "so me middle- sized scrap of theor y" is all that will be relevant-
we need not assume that every other sentenc e will need to have its truth -value 
reexamined . 
11 Quine is slippery about whether the web of belief is a co llection of opinions a 
concrete person affirms , o r a collection of opinions somt:how affirmed by the 
natural sciences at large, or a collection of sent ences affirmed by some subset 
of th e natural sciences (like th e exact sciences), o r omething else. For a related 
criticis m abo ut Quine's slipp ery use of th e word "sc ience," see Hacker 2006: 
238- 9. 
12 Gale's readin g is not without fou ndat ion. James doe s think that emotion plays an 
imp ortant role in elevating conceptions to full-blooded beliefs. Still, in the pas-
sage at issue here, James is clearl y discussing a lready-es tabli shed beliefs; "desire" 
comes in on th e experience side, as somethin g that we might tak e account of 
when we revise tho se beliefs. 
13 Thi s is a well-established interpretive point about Quine . O n simplicity and clar-
ity as va lues scientist s use in guiding revisions to th eir web of belief, see Quine 
1960b: 161. 
14 For a commentary that lays heavy emphasis on this passage, see O' Connell 
199 7: 94. 
15 There is other evidence that Quine's interest in the relationship between our sen-
sory promptings and our scientific theories is prompted by a concern with some-
thing like justification. Quine wrote a letter to Hookwa y upon reading (Hookway 
1988 ). The letter (which Hilary Putnam published on his blog in 2015 ) reads 
in part: "My focus on stimulations reflects a divergence in purpo se from David-
son .... The philosophical focus of his concern with translation is other minds. 
My concern is panl y that, or meaning, but I am concerned to integrate these mat-
ters with "naturalized epistemology" in general, that is, the th eory of evidence for 
science. Hence my starting point is the sensory receptors. " He appeals to "sensory 
receptors" as a way to shed naturalized- epistemological light on "evidence for sci-
ence," or in other words on what I am loosely calling "justification. " 
16 At any rate, the relationship between evidence and theor y in this oft-quoted pas-
sage is typically taken to be a justificatory relation. For instance, after quoting 
this pas sage H ylton writes that for Quine, epistemolog y " is concerned not only 
with how we can kn ow anything about the world, but also with the question how 
we can say or believe an ything-true or false-about the world at all" (Hylton 
2007: 81-2 ). Quine 's question is how it is pos sible to have kn ow ledge-belief s 
th at are at least justified and tru e-not how we might most fruitfully search.for 
knowledge, for H ylton . That is, Quine's epistemology aims at an account of ius-
tification, not discovery. N ote, by the way, that explaining justifi cation is not the 
same thing as justifying an explanation. Quin e famously wanted to give up .the 
notion that epistemology aims to justif y or make more secure established scien-
tific explanations (Quine 1969: 76). But that is compatible with the idea that ~e 
is intere sted in explaining justification. Finally, the sense of "explain" here wi.11 
be "ge netic" and "psychological," as H ylton puts it (2007: 91-7), but what is 
gett ing explained is still justification, for Quin e. 
17 For Kant, "aesthetic" pertains to the study of sense perception in general. He 
had criticize d (at Kant 1781_1787/1965, A21/B 35) Baumgart en's narrower use 
of the wor d to indicate only the study of taste or artistic judgment. James's own 
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usage is closer to Baumgarten. James tells us what he takes to be "the broadest 
genera.of resthetic feeling[:] joy, sorrow, pleasure, [and] pain," at (PP: 194). 
18 James _is famously voluntaristic about belief, but at WTB: 15, he is quite explicit 
in saymg that not all of our opinions are under our direct control: "C an we, 
by any effort of our will, or by any strength of wish that it were true, believe 
ourselves well and about when we are roaring with rheumatism in bed or feel 
certain that the sum of the two one-dollar bills in our pocket must be a hundred 
dollars?" James's point is that the most wishful thinker in the world will be pow -
erless to believe that she is healthy when she is really bedridden, for example. So 
there are cases where belief revision is forced on us, whether or not we have any 
desire to accommodate facts, for James. · 
19 These passages from Pragmatism suggest that desire is the key emotion he thinks 
relevant to cognition, but at WTB: 18, he also accepts a role for "fear and hope, 
prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, the circumpressure of our 
caste and set." 
20 A caveat is in order. Most formulations of the wishful thinking worry are indebted 
to Clifford (1877), who argued that there are no cases where we are licensed to 
alter belief in light of emotion. But even if one accepts the argument (that I am 
about to mount) to the effect that are some counter-examples to this sweeping 
claim, one might still worry that James's epistemology might countenance too 
much, allowing for wishful thinking even where it clearly ought to be avoided. 
For instance, if we grant that wishful thinking is permissible in cases like Barry 
Marshall's, we still might wonder why it is not permissible in cases like racist 
eugenics research . So a full response to the wishful thinking objection would 
require both an account of the kinds of scenarios where adjusting belief in light 
of an emotion is warranted, and also an account of the kinds of scenarios where 
it is not so warranted. My case study addresses the former issue only. In Klein 
2015, I have touched on the restrictions James places on allowable influence from 
emotions on cognition, but I do not have space to do this issue justice here. 
21 For a more complete philosophical account of this work than I can offer here, 
see Thagard 1999. 
22 I have argued against the notion that pragmatists can accept that scientific test-
ing involves entertaining a belief without fully believing it, in Klein 2015: 96- 7. 
23 Interestingly, he put himself at more risk than he understood at the time. He was 
prepared to treat himself with the antibiotic tinidazole, which he did after his 
final biopsy despite by then being symptom-free. But Marshall reports that in a 
subsequent trial, 23 out of 24 patients treated with tinidazole "merely developed 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria, which were then rather difficult to eradicate " (Mar-
shall 2006: 798). So had his infection not spontaneously remitted, he would not 
have had a cure ready. 
24 Gastritis is a milder form of gastric irritation than PUD. 
25 See above, p. 233. 
26 In contrast, James does seem to think that emotions can provide cognitive 
guidance-after all, we have seen his suggestion that emotions may help some 
insightful people "vim naturae magis sentiunt" [feel the force of nature more] 
when framing hypotheses . 
27 See above, p. 234 . 
28 Quine advocates disquotationalism in Word and Object, considering and reject-
ing Peirce's pragmatist account of truth (Quine 1960b: 21-2). As Hookway 
points out, "Peirce is only able to defend such a view ... by rejecting naturalism, 
and studying [the nature of truth from] ... within a purified first philosoph y" 
(Hookway 1988: 69). Quine had better reject anything like a pragmatist account 
of truth, in other words, on pain of contradicting the strictures of his own nat-
uralized epistemology. Elsewhere I have argued that (like Hookway's Peirce), 
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James (also ) has an anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy as a discipline that 
must function from a position outside the sciences (Klein 2008) . Thus it may be 
that the ultimate root of James and Quine's disharmon y is the question of how 
philosophy is related to the natural sciences. 
29 James says his own web of belief model is meant to explain how "an y individual 
settles into new opinions" (P: 34); the evolutionary story is meant to explain 
how communities of individuals form consensuses over time . 
30 Thus like intuitionist mathematicians, pragmatists like James have to reject the 
law of the excluded middle. Not all claims are either true or false. Claims that 
have (to date) been neither directl y verified nor refuted have some third valence; 
they are indeterminate. 
31 Here I have in mind not just traditional observational evidence, but also cogni-
tive virtues like simplicity and elegance. 
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